39 Minutes

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Baltimore City Police

39 Minutes of Terror

LOMBARD & CAREY

Hail of sniper bullets in 1976 changed five lives forever. The incident forever changed the Baltimore Police Department One Officer dead four others shot and critically wounded A detailed account of the incident from official reports including the time line of each minute as this unfolded. Official BPD reports, photographs from public domain and news articles will give the full story as never seen or heard before. With the guidance, assistance and help of Lieutenant Joseph Key who was 1930 unit that faithful night to later assume 2501 Command Post, Incident Commander. The Command Post Unit #2501 once activated becomes the voice and authority of the Baltimore Police Commissioner. A transcript of each BPD Radio channel will be posted in its entirety. Each and every word that was spoken over BPD communications will be presented to give insight as to exactly was taking place that night.

PROLOGUE

I provided Bill Hackley with the materials regarding Lombard and Carey and the inception of the Quick Response Teams because I had them for thirty plus years and, like me, they were just getting older and not doing anybody much good. What good can these materials do? They can serve as a reminder that preserving the status quo in the dangerous business of police work can get cops killed. All of the materials concerning Lombard and Carey are a matter of public record. The documents concerning the establishing of the Quick Response Teams are not public records, but, since I wrote them and have provided them to countless other agencies, I am putting them out there. Their only relevance now is to history. The reader will note that they are signed by the, then, Acting Commanding Officer of Tactical, who believed that any correspondence from his unit should be signed by him. As long as the program was approved, it didn’t make much difference to me whose signature was on it. Regardless, they document the founding of SWAT operations in the Baltimore Police Department at a time when moving ahead with new concepts was like pulling good teeth out of a really pissed off Grizzly Bear’s mouth–a chancy business at best.

Some of the heroes in the command structure at the beginning of that process were Bishop Robinson and Joe Bolesta. Of particular note on the operational level, then and later, was Lieutenant Darryl Duggins (1901 in the City Wide Communications Tape Transcript). Duggins was a sometimes recalcitrant, always plain spoken, always forge ahead and damn the "brass," brilliant leader and implementer of the structural minutia that makes a group of diverse and resistive personalities into a cohesive unit. Darryl was a Marine at Chosin Reservoir. Nothing else needs to be said.

How do the documents concerning the founding of the QRT relate to Lombard and Carey? The one led to the other, or, rather, significantly sped up the other. In the months just prior to Lombard and Carey, Bishop Robinson, who was Chief of Patrol, convened several meetings of Tactical supervisors and the Commanding Officer of Tactical, Joe Bolesta. Bolesta was, and is, a more refined version of Duggins; i.e., a man that had the fortitude to stand up to command, but could do it without making unnecessary enemies that could hurt

his goals and those of his unit. I was a sergeant in Tactical at the time (1930 and 2501 in the City Wide Communications Tape Transcript) and was assigned the task of writing the general order for the resolution of sniper, barricade, and hostage situations. I completed that assignment by January of 1976. With Captain Bolesta’s permission, I began training my squad in SWAT procedures. We worked mostly on our time with equipment we bought and used tactical procedures I had acquired from military tactics manuals, Los Angeles SWAT (In operation, by contrast, since the late 60's), New York SWAT, and other similar programs. We did all of the physical training on our own time, although the effort was something like filling up a balloon with mud. In February of ‘76, Captain Bolesta sent my squad to the FBI SWAT school. On Good Friday, April 16, 1976, my squad was the only squad in the Baltimore Police Department with any SWAT training. On that evening John Earl Williams decided to impress his girlfriend by killing a few cops.

Shortly before 7:00 p.m. on Good Friday the temperature was above 90 degrees. TAC had been redeployed to the area around Lombard and Carey because Williams had called and told Communications that he planned to kill cops. Williams was a nothing person whose girlfriend (in his mind only) had told him to get lost. His attempt to impress her landed him in prison, where, the last I heard, he has had many relationships much more "fulfilling" than the one he used as an excuse for his madness. I’m sure his role in prison is the achievement pinnacle of his pathetic life.

Williams had briefly been in the National Guard and had received some training in weapons and tactics from them. He had also stolen some equipment from the Guard and had amassed a large quantity of ammunition and long guns. Specifically, that night he was shooting a 300 Winchester magnum, an 8mm Magnum, a 30-06, a 12 gauge shotgun, and perhaps others. After ingesting some PCP, he began his shooting spree shortly before 7:00 p.m.. His first targets were TAC officers, who, ironically, became his targets because of their redeployment to the area in response to his threats.

As for the rest of the story, the transcript of the tapes and photos will tell it. All of the officers were shot within the first nine minutes of the inception of the incident. They were removed from the line of fire within forty minutes and the

incident was over in less than an hour. There were numerous heroes on that night, starting with, of course, Jimmy Halcomb, a decorated Marine Vietnam veteran. A hero not just because he gave his life, but because he, like nearly two hundred other cops, responded to the call of cops taking fire. He and the officers who were wounded (Jimmy Brennan, Art Kennel, Neal Splain, Calvin Mencken, Roland Miller) were trying to stop Williams and did what cops do by profession and calling–they ran into the mouth of the dragon when others were running away. Also, off duty Homicide Detective, Nick Giangrazo (forgive the spelling), who ran from a position of safety across Lombard Street into the killing zone to help put Jimmy Brennan in a van and drive him from the scene. Brennan had been dragged behind the van by his friend and fellow Western District Officer, Doug Bryson, during a hail of gunfire. He had lain there bleeding from the time the incident began, but was kept alive by Bryson who had applied direct pressure to Brennan's gaping, gushing wounds in his elbow and side. Then there was Mike Hurm from TAC and Frank Stallings from the Western who pulled Halcomb out during the barrage of cover fire. It was, unfortunately, too late because Officer Halcomb had died instantly, but their effort was no less courageous. The reality was that all of the officers who responded that night did so selflessly and without concern for their personal safety and with the one overriding motivation of helping brother officers.

The entire incident lasted a little more than thirty-five minutes, but its repercussions still linger through today. I was scheduled to start training other TAC squads in SWAT tactics on Monday, April 19^th. Lombard and Carey had been the first incident where members of the, then, nonexistent QRT had been deployed. Members of my squad were assigned as observers for the counter-sniper, an evacuation team, a gas deployment team, and entry team for 1303 Lombard after Williams was forced out by the cover fire fusillade. Those roles had been learned and practiced primarily on their own time. Lombard and Carey would lay the groundwork for ensuring that training and equipping the QRT became a mandated, on-duty, part of the Department’s response to sniper, barricade, and hostage situations.

There were many flaws in the Department’s response to Lombard and Carey. Communications’ discipline was practically nonexistent. Officers gave conflicting information concerning the location of Williams, which resulted in

officers firing on officers. Contradictory information concerning the removal of wounded officers resulted in Jimmy Halcomb being left where he fell for over twenty minutes. Again, Halcomb was killed immediately, but that didn’t change the fact that his location should have been identified and a rescue effort mounted much more quickly. The command post, 2501, was implemented and manned only by a rookie sergeant who gave all of the orders until 1303 Lombard had been declared secure by the entry team. Two colonels were on the scene, but neither gave orders, responded and/or stayed at the command post until after Williams came out.

Over the years there has been much criticism concerning the handling of Lombard and Carey. The main reason why it occurred the way it did, however, was the failure by the Department to recognize the need for a specialized team and disciplined response to such incidents well before the efforts of Bishop Robinson and Joe Bolesta. After all, there had been many similar incidents around the country and several such incidents in Baltimore prior to April 16^th. Old line thinking, petty interdepartmental rivalries, and a drag-them-out-by-their-hair mentality dictated the entire response spectrum to situations like Lombard and Carey. I wish that I could say that Good Friday, April 16, 1976 changed all of that, but it would take many years for any true change to occur and, even then, not a whole hearted change. In addition to honoring the cops that were there that night, the posting of these materials is meant to stand as a stark reminder of what can happen when a police department loses, or, more accurately, never finds its ability to give the same weight to issues vital to officer safety as it does to its crime reduction mission. In the past crime reduction has trumped all other concerns. Today, the certain eventuality of terrorist attacks in this country should compel the Baltimore Police Department to ensure that all of its officers are well prepared to meet such challenges. It is an absolute that Baltimore Police Officers will thrust themselves into the breach, with or without proper training, with or without appropriate guidelines, and with or without necessary equipment. They will do so and some will pay the price like Jimmy Halcomb, Jimmy Brennan, Roland Miller, Art Kennel, Neal Splain, and Calvin Mencken did on that hot night in April. It is incumbent on the Baltimore Police Department to provide them the tools, guidelines, and training they will need. The tragedy of Lombard and Carey demands that.

Finally, I didn’t know what I was going to do with the documents that I had until I came across Bill Hackley’s website. I was much impressed by his sole dedication to memorializing the Baltimore Police Department’s rich history and the huge amount of work he puts into the effort. Although retired from active service, his exemplary service to the Department and its officers continues today. I can think of no better way to have the story of Lombard and Carey told than to entrust it to Bill Hackley. I know he will do it justice.

Charles J. Key
Lieutenant, Baltimore Police Department (Retired)

po Halcomb

Baltimore City Police Officer Jimmy Dale Halcomb age 31, E.O.W. April 16, 1976, an 8 year veteran of the Western District and a former Marine. He was married, the father of two children and his widow Angela was expecting their 3rd. child within the month. His badge number is 293 and he was the first BPD Officer to die in the line of duty in 1976. - Jimmy died on Good Friday and his killer was born on Christmas Day, 18 years earlier.

officers wounded

Officer James A. Brennan, 25 years old assigned Western District, wounds on the left side and right shoulder. - Officer Neil C. Splain, 28 years old assigned Southern District, shotgun wounds in the face. - Officer Roland W. Miller, 23 years old assigned Southern District, shotgun wounds left arm. - Officer Calvin L. Mencken, Jr. Assigned to the Southern District, shotgun wounds in the face. - Officer Arthur E. Kennell,Jr. shotgun wounds in the face and eyes. - Civilian: George Weaver 23 years old, bullet wound in the hand.
Scan9

This sketch is slightly off scale as you can clearly see in the aerial shots. The BCFD house should be where the two cars are sketched. As officers reported on the air that they were on the roof of the firehouse and were looking down on where the injured officers were pinned down.

Officer Jimmy Halcomb and the other officers were shot within six minutes of the start of this incident, avery warm evening with 90+ degrees at the time of this operation.

When cover fire was ordered for the attempt for officers to reach the injured officers 487 rounds were fired in sixty seconds as determined by reports written by each officer involved.

Police Department

Baltimore, Maryland
16, April 1976

TRANSCRIPT

City-Wide Dispatcher

450Mhz

Time:18:59:10

CAR: 1933. We have shots fired.

DIS: Unit in reference to the shots being fired. No. the unit with the shots fired.

CAR: 1933 in the unit block of South Carey, we got somebody shooting at us.

DIS: Unit South Carey. 10-4

SIMULCAST

DIS: Unit Block of South Carey,1933 says someone is discharging firearms at that location. Unit block of south Carey.

FT: Foxtrot responding.

DIS: Okay. 1933 are they shooting at you.

CAR: 10-4, they shot the radiator out of the car.

(ALERT TONE)

DIS: All units be advised they are shooting at 1933 car, unit block of south Carey SIGNAL 13, time 1900

CAR:__?___ responding to South Carey.

CAR: 1933- advise them not to come up Carey Street. They're gonna get shot.

DIS: all units all units 10-6 1933 only.

CAR: Tell them not to come up Carey , they're gonna get shot.

DIS: Don't come up Carey Street.

SIMULCAST

DIS: All units be advised do not go up Carey Street. Do not go on the unit block of Carey.

CAR: Keep 'em off Lombard. 1901 in reference.

19:01:00

DIS: Go ahead.

CAR: Ascertain if 1933 can operate his vehicle and if so, get it out of that area.

DIS: 1933

CAR: 1912 in reference.

DIS: Go ahead

CAR: Be advised the third floor house on the corner. The man is armed with a shotgun.
DIS: Third floor house on the corner Unit block Carey?

CAR: __?__ hundred block of South Carey.

DIS: Cruising Patrol Eleven.

CAR: C.P. 11.

DIS: Okay you respond to the unit block South Carey, don't go on Carey Street at this time.

CAR: Negative on Carey Street 10-4, sir.

DIS: OK

CAR: 1914. Advise Fox Trot it sounds like rifle fire.

DIS: All units 10-6 1914, go ahead.

CAR: Sir, advise Foxtrot it sounds like rifle fire.

FT: Fox Trot OK, we'll leave the area.

DIS: OK, I got rifle fire, is that the unit block South Carey on the corner; can you give me a house number or something better.

CAR: --?---?---- House.

DIS: The third floor the corner house. Can you give me the corner? What's it, Northwest, Southwest corner.

CAR: Southwest corner second house from the corner.

DIS: Southwest corner, second house.

SIMULCAST

DIS: Ok, in reference to this shooting, the subject is in the second house from the corner, Southwest corner. He's on the third floor. He may have a rifle. Fox Trot use caution.

19:02:30

FT: Fox Trot OK we're a good distance away, and we still have it under observation.

DIS: 10-4

CAR: Cruising Patrol Eleven --?--. CP 11.

CAR: 1924---have our units switch to City-Wide so we can control --?--.

DIS: KGA to unit 9

19:03:10

CAR: 1919- we still got gun shots. Have them get these people in the house.

CAR: Cruising Patrol 11.

CAR: Have all units clear these people off the street.

DIS: KGA to unit 9.

CAR: 1912 to Fox Trot. Leave the area.

FT: Fox Trot OK.

CAR: CP 11.

CAR: 1912

SIMULCAST

DIS: Attention all cars, information from Unit 9, stay out of the Unit Block of South Carey Street. Try to get a location.

CAR: 10-33, 10-33.

19:04:00

DIS: Go ahead.

CAR: 793- My partner's hit down here. Get me an Ambo.

DIS: What location?

CAR: Please get me the ambo down here now.

CAR: 10-33

DIS: Where's 793 at?

CAR: Unit South Carey Street; Unit South Carey.

DIS: OK.

Car: C.P. 11- Ascertain where they want us to move into for a command post?

DIS: KGA to Unit 9.

Car: Unit block of South Carey, pedestrians are still coming in this area.

DIS: All units 10-6 on this channel in reference to the 10-33. 10-6. 793 can you give us an exact location?

CAR: Yes Sir, right in front of the fire house on Carey Street. Don't let these come in here. And if you could have some of these police return fire to that guy so we can get this officer out of here.

CAR: 1912 with a 10-33. 1912.

19:05:10

DIS: 1912.

CAR: Be advised Sir the subject is on the third floor and it's the second house in from the store. There's a pocketbook on the front steps and information from the neighbors, this guy's got arsenal in there. Better get E.V.U. over there.

DIS: Ok, see if you can ascertain from a neighbor or somebody, get us an exact address.

SIMULCAST

Attention all cars in reference to Carey Street. We have second house from the store. He's in the third floor: he's heavily armed.

CAR: 1944.

DIS: 1944.

CAR: Can you have a unit respond to----ah, correction, the truck. The sniper equipment on it---ah, stand by. I'll give you a location later.

CAR: Is the E.V.U. unit responding?

DIS: Cruising Patrol 11's on the way; where do you want Cruising Patrol 11 to go?

CAR: 1930- Did anybody establish a command post?

19:06:50

DIS: KGA to Unit 9.

CAR: 1901

DIS: 1901, can you set up a Command Post?

CAR: 10-4, when I arrive on the scene. But in the meantime can you have 1910, 20 and 30 cordon off the area, don their jump suits and stand by?

CAR 1930; I have set up a Command Post at Baltimore and Carey, a block away from it; have CP 11, 10-11 me here. We're moving people back.

DIS: Cruising Patrol 11.

CAR: 10-4 Baltimore and Carey.

CAR: I'm on the eastern side of Carey Street at Baltimore and Carey, a block from the shots.

LOMBARD CAREY2a

CAR: 1919.

DIS: Go ahead.

CAR: Advise those units not to walk down Carey. Gunshot fire, is coming straight up Carey. Clear shot.

DIS: The Command Post is at Baltimore and Carey, East of Carey.

CAR: 10-4.

SIMULCAST

DIS: ALL Units be advised the Command Post is at Baltimore and Carey, east of Carey. Do not go on Carey.

CAR: 1912- have all units in the Carey and Baltimore Street area 10-26.

19:08:00

DIS: Ok, cruising patrol 11 be advised that officer is supposed to be hit in the chest. He's on Carey Street. 793 unit. Ambulance is responding.

CAR: 10-4 Do you wish us at Baltimore and Carey?

DIS: They want you at Baltimore and Carey, East of Carey; do not go on Carey at this time.

CAR: 10-4 Baltimore and Carey.

CAR: 1930-have all units stand by until CP 11 reaches the Command Post. Seal off the perimeter, we've moved the perimeter back from Baltimore Street and Carey; Have them do the same thing down on Hollins Street.

19:08:30

DIS: The Tactical supervisor is on the scene and they're keeping the people and the officers away from the unit block of Carey.

CAR: Can you get the street lights off down here? Get the street lights out.

(ALERT TONE)

DIS: All units on the scene at Baltimore and Carey or in the vicinity, switch 10-26. Stay on the City-Wide channel.

19:08:50

CAR: 1914. Can I lateral with 1930?

CAR: KGA advise all units the subject is also firing into the rear of the building.

CAR: 1930 is 10-4. 1930 to 1910.

CAR: 1910.

CAR: Do you have any units that can seal off the back of that building?

CAR: I have several units right here on Lombard Street and they can't move. They're not in a position to get out of the way of the guy's gunfire.

CAR: 10-4. I have Baltimore and Carey Streets sealed off. If you can insure the back of the house, we've established a perimeter up here. The Command Post will be on the Eastern side of Carey at Baltimore and Carey.

CAR: 10-4. I am at Stockton and Carey.

CAR: You 10-4 on the Command Post?

CAR: 10-9 the location.

CAR: The east side of Baltimore Street, At Baltimore and Carey.

CAR: 10-4

CAR: 830 in reference to this call.

CAR: 926- 10-33

DIS: Go ahead.

CAR: Give me an ambo.

DIS: Unit with the 10-33 only, please.

CAR: 926,-I'm shot Get me an ambo.

DIS: Where are you at, 926?

CAR: In the rear of Lombard Street, behind where the sniper is.

DIS: Rear of Lombard near Carey?

(ALERT TONE- SIMULCAST)

DIS: All units stay out of range of the house, this subject is armed with a high powered rifle. Stay out of range the unit block of south Carey Street. We have several officers who have been shot at this time. Do not respond to Baltimore and Carey unless you're going to the command Post or nearby.

19:10:40

CAR: 830

DIS: 830

CAR: I'm on the second floor of the fire house here. And the suspect is I believe at 1303 West Lombard Street on the third floor, the house with the third floor window open.

DIS: Ok, 830, give me that address again.

CAR: 1303 West Lombard Street. I think that's where he's firing from. I'm on the second floor of the firehouse on Carey Street.

(SIMULCAST)

DIS: Ok, all units be advised- we have information from 830 this subject may possibly be at 1303 West Lombard in the rear, third floor.

CAR: 1914.

DIS: 1914.

CAR: 1914 to 1930.

CAR: 1930 go ahead.

CAR: Sarge, we're directly across the street, there's an abandoned building; when CP 11gets here, you may send him up here. It'll be a clear shot if we have to take this guy out.

CAR: 10-4. Give me an exact location of where you are?

CAR: I have no address, I'm in the back; I'm staying out of the --ah, out of the line of fire here. I'm directly across the street.

CAR: 901, 901, 901 to the Command Post.

DIS: Ok, the unit for the Command Post.

CAR: 901 car.

DIS: You're not at the Command Post, are you?

CAR: Negative. I'm at Carey and Lombard. Have one of those men with gas, report to Carey and Lombard; we may not be able to put gas in this house.

CAR: 1930 10-4. We have the CP here, we're setting up. We'll send it down by foot. I'm gonna leave the CP, the cruising patrol here.

CAR: 10-4

DIS: Ok, 901 can you give me a safe location for an ambulance to stand by there near there?

CAR: 10-4

DIS: 901 go ahead.

CAR: Have an ambo meet me at Carey and Lombard.

DIS: Carey and Lombard, 901; 10-4.

CAR: 935.

CAR: They'll be right in the line of fire.

CAR: 1930 all units at the shooting scene 10-6. We're getting CP 11 in position, we'll have it shortly, just 10-6, seal the perimeter.

CAR: --?-- with a 10-33.

DIS: Unit with a 10-33.

CAR: On the northeast corner of Lombard and Carey I have an officer shot in the arm, needs immediate attention. They can come in behind the bar in the alley.

DIS: Is this Carey and Lombard in the alley on Lombard?

CAR: We're on the northeast corner.

CAR: Be advised if they come in from that direction, they're gonna have to have somebody with armor protection because he's got that whole side of the street covered.

CAR: 2245 in relative to the sniper.

DIS: 901 . All units 10-6. All units 10-6. 901. KGA to 901. 901. 901.

CAR: 901

DIS: They're gonna send the ambulance to Carey and Lombard. You can either intercept them or pick 'em up at that location and then dispatch 'em as you see fit in a safe manner from that location.

CAR: Carey and Lombard is good. Have 'em stand by there.

19:14:30

LOMBARD CAREY3a

Lombard Carey sniper incident

Police officers take shelter behind parked cars at Lombard & Carey streets as they exchange gunfire with the sniper

CAR: 942 for the ambo, 942 for the ambo.

19:14:40

DIS: 942.

CAR: Bring it to Pratt Street. The officers are going down to Pratt Street.

DIS: All units 10-6. 942 you're gonna have to repeat.

CAR: The two injured officers that are shot are going to Pratt Street. Have the ambo respond to Pratt street.

DIS: 901 you Ok?

CAR: 10-4

CAR: 2245 KGA

DIS: Go ahead.

CAR: In relative to the shooting, 935 and myself are on the third floor directly across from the sniper. It's 1306 Lombard. Will you get somebody up here with a rifle he could probably fire in that direction, 10-4. We have a shotgun only with the shells itself, no slugs or anything.

CAR: 1930, give me your exact location?

DIS: What is your exact location?

SIMULCAST

DIS: All units please stay off the air. All units wait until you're acknowledged. Too many units are calling 10-33 and you are over ridding each other. 901 is on the scene, we have a Command Post established; please get on City-Wide and wait until you're acknowledged before you give your message.

CAR: 1912 with a 10-33.

DIS: 1912.

CAR: Be advised he's on the second floor. He's breaking the second floor windows out now.

CAR: 1930.

DIS: he's in 1306. He's in 1306, is that correct?

CAR: 2245 - It's either four or six, there'll be an officer in the rear waiting for somebody to come with a rifle.

DIS: Also 901. Give that to Cruising Patrol 11. He's either in 1304 or 6. He has moved to the 2nd. floor at this time.

19:16:40

CAR: 2501.

DIS: 2501, go ahead.

CAR: 2501. I have Unit 9 on the scene with me. The Command Post is at Baltimore and Carey. I have CP 11 responding with one man with a rifle, one man with gas. Give me the exact location to send them.

DIS: 901.

CAR: 901- have them report to Pratt and Lombard.

DIS: Send them to Pratt and Lombard, Sir. Pratt and Lombard.

CAR: 2245 in relative to that man with the rifle and gas. 2245 in relative to the man with the rifle and gas. If he comes to where my 10-20 is, 1304 or six Lombard, he'll have a perfect shot in the direction where the sniper is. 10-4?

CAR: 2501. 10-9 that----

CAR: 2245 I'm at either 1304 or six West Lombard. I'm directly across, I'm on the third floor across from where the sniper is, if the man with the rifle and gas would come to this 10-20 he would have almost a perfect shot into the dwelling.

CAR: 10-4, I'm sending 'em down. You're at either 1304 0r 1306; the sniper man is at 1303 or 1305 is that 10-4?

CAR: That 10-20 is 1303 the sniper. I'm in, I think I'm at four. It might be six. First come to the rear. There'll be an officer to show you, I'm on the third floor.

CAR: 10-4.

CAR: 901 in reference.

DIS: 901.

CAR: Can you send another unit with gas to Pratt and Carey? Report we may pour gas in the rear besides the front.

DIS: That's Cruising Patrol 11 you want at Pratt and Carey

CAR: 1912.

DIS: Go ahead, 1912.

DIS: Sir, be advised we're in the adjoining house directly behind the suspect's house. There are two officers on the second floor, They're in plain clothes.

CAR: That's smart.

CAR: 10-9 that in reference to the police officers, 836 10-9 that message about the police officers being on the roof.

DIS: The unit calling in reference to the two plain clothes men, where are they at?

19:19:00

CAR: 1912 in reference; we're in the house directly behind the suspect house. We're on the second floor rear.

CAR: 901.

DIS: Go ahead.

CAR: 962 in reference to that sniper.

DIS: Go ahead.

CAR: 962 in reference to that sniper.

DIS: Go ahead.

CAR: Be advised, he's on the second floor. Second floor.

CAR: 814 in reference to the sniper.

DIS: 814.

CAR: The sniper..firing at the house on the even side of the 1200 block. He just fired four shots, anybody with a loudspeaker better start yelling for those people.

DIS: Unit 9 switch to channel 9.

CAR: 901 car.

DIS: 901.

CAR: Have all units hold their positions until they can move in with the gas.

DIS: Attention all cars on the scene of the shooting, hold your present position, stay in your present position until Cruising Patrol 11 has established a position.

CAR: 930 in reference, please.

DIS: Go ahead.

CAR: We have a witness that has an eyewitness view of that sniper shooting, he's in the first house next to the store in the 1300 block of Lombard and that would be on the south side.

SIMULCAST

DIS: Ok in reference to this Carey Street, please wait until you are acknowledged before you go ahead with your message, unless you have an injured officer.

19:20:40

CAR: 901.

DIS: 901 go ahead.

CAR: Ascertain if all the injured have been cared for.

CAR: 2501- 10-4.

DIS: Ok, has 973 been taken care of?

CAR: 2501 to 901.

CAR: 901.

CAR: Do you have the injured officer in sight down there?

CAR: 10-9.

CAR: Do you have the injured officers in sight down there?

CAR: I had two injured officers, they have been taken away in the ambos.

CAR: 2501, 10-4; the injured officers have been taken care of.

CAR: Is that also the one that was on the corner of Carey and Lombard?

CAR: Negative. Negative.

LOMBARD CAREY2a

CAR: 943 in reference.

DIS: All units 10-6. 901 I have information ---this is Radio---I have information that two officers, one from 793 and one from 926. Have they been cared for?

19:21:50

CAR: 926's been cared for---unknown on 793.

CAR: 1930 in reference.

DIS: Go ahead, 1930.

CAR: I escorted two officers; one in two different radio cars, to University Hospital. That's two officers went to University.

CAR: Where they plain clothes?

CAR: No one was in uniform. I couldn't tell if the other one was in plain clothes or uniform. They went in two different radio cars.

CAR: 793-A. My partner was down at Lombard and Carey behind the parked cars. He took a direct hit. Did anybody get him?

DIS: 793, was your partner in plain clothes or uniform?

CAR: Plain clothes, Sir.

CAR: 711 in reference.

DIS: Go ahead.

CAR: We're at the Northeast of Carey and Lombard. We got two officers down; one hit in the arm and one got hit in the chest. We are pinned down; we can't get out.

19:22:50

CAR: 2501 to all units---10-6. Give me your location again. 2501 to that unit, what is your location exactly?

DIS: Lombard and Carey, northeast corner. On Carey Street just north of Lombard; we can't get anybody in or out.

CAR: 10-4.... 10-6, we have help on the way.

CAR: 732 in reference to the ambo.

DIS: 732.

CAR: I got an ambo at Carrollton and Lombard. I think he's on standby.

CAR: Try and get an armored car?

CAR: 1914

CAR:1951 to 2501... 1951 to 2501.

CAR: 830 to 2501 in reference to the injured officers. 830 in reference to the injured officers.

CAR: 747.

DIS: 747

CAR: Be advised I've got four officers in a house directly across the street. We've got a clear shot right into his second floor window if you want to have that EVU wagon come up here, he can gain entrance to the vacant house by coming down Hollins Street in the back.

DIS: All units 10-6. All units. 747, give me the exact location.

CAR: Either 1304 or 1306 Lombard. It's a vacant building and we're on the second floor----no, third floor----- we got a straight shot into his second floor window.

DIS: 2501, you copy this information? They state they have three officers available at 1404 or six West Lombard. They have a direct line of fire for this suspect. They need the EVU Unit at that location.

CAR: 2501 be advised the EVU Unit is en route to that location with gas and a rifle. Have them 10-6; also have they cleared the other side of the two buildings on either side of the building where the sniper is cleared?

DIS: 901.... 901.

CAR: 795....795.....795 in reference to the injured officers.

DIS: 901, do you know if they cleared both sides of that building?

CAR: Uncertain on that Sir.

DIS: What unit has the Cruising Patrol 11?

CAR: 2501 Cruising Patrol 11 is here. We have two Cruising Patrol people on the way down with 1951.

DIS: 747, you are at 1304 or six West Lombard? Is that correct?

CAR: 10-4. We got a shotgun in the building and if they are gonna come down they can get in the back way. There's an officer gonna show 'em the way in.

DIS: 2501, they want Cruising 11 to respond to the rear of, it's either 1304 or six, there is an officer in the rear; he will show 'em where to come in. They come in the rear, they're directly opposite 1303 where that subject has now went back to the third floor.

CAR: 1914 in reference.

CAR: 830 in reference to these injured officers.

DIS: Go ahead, 830.

CAR: They're on the northeast corner of Carey Street and Lombard. They're behind the blue and white van. Now we got to get these men out of here somehow or another.

DIS: 2501.... All units 10-6. The Command Post will handle this. 10-6.....2501.

19:26:50

CAR: 2501.

DIS: The injured officers are trapped, the northeast corner of Carey and Lombard. They're behind a blue and white van; they can't get 'em out at this time. Can you handle this?

CAR: 2501... I am sending a team down. The team is en route now.

DIS: Ok, all units be advised. There is a team en route to Carey and Lombard to assist the injured officers.....10-6 unless you have emergency information.

CAR: 801.

DIS: Go ahead, 801

CAR: 801 -----10-32 this location. Information from the duty officer we have enough men present.

DIS: You want to 10-32 Carey and Lombard, you want no more units to respond?

19:27:40

DIS: Be advised we getting more injured officers

CAR: 1917 to 2501 be advised one block west the 1300 block civilians are still getting through. They're still coming down here.

Can you seal it off? we had a guy ride down the middle of the street on a bike.

DIS: All units, special attention to 2501 and 901. Any injured police you can get 'em, take 'em to Carrollton and Lombard. There's a Battalion Chief there with ambulance crews to transport same.

CAR: 830 in reference to this sniper.

DIS: Go ahead, 830.

CAR: I'm going to the firehouse and I have 1964 unit from Tactical here with me. And they have a clear fire of the window where the sniper is. And we're over-looking the two injured officers here.

CAR: 2501 to 1951....2501 to the C.P.

19:28:50

CAR: Are you with the man with the rifle?

CAR: 10-4...Permission to fire when ready.

CAR: Permission is granted. Unit 9 has granted permission, fire when you have a clear field to fire.

CAR: 1940, He's moved to the third floor again.

CAR: 2187 in reference.

CAR: 2501. All units 10-6. 2501 to 901.

CAR: 901.

CAR: The people that are sealing the perimeter on Lombard Street. as I understand there was a bicycle that came down the middle of it. Can you send a couple more people to see that that doesn't happen?

CAR: I just sent another man up there on that.

CAR: 10-4 Thank-you Would you report that to the Command Post?

CAR: 10-4

CAR: 2187.

DIS: 2187.

LOMBARD CAREY3a

CAR: Be advised sir, I'm positioned up high and in the back alley. There is glass breaking out of the back part of one of those buildings; it may be him in one of those buildings. Glass just broke up there.

CAR: 836 in reference.

CAR: That's me. That ain't him, that's me.

DIS: That's 836 car, use caution; be aware of other officers and several plain clothes men are on the scene.

CAR: Don't go into that building unless cleared from the Command Post.

CAR: 1901, do you have a landline you can get me a number on, Joe?

CAR: 10-6 for a minute.

CAR: 1914.

DIS: 1914.

CAR: sir, we're in the building directly across the street, we have a shotgun and a clear line of fire. did you say permission to fire was granted?

19:30:50

CAR: 2501... That is 10-4. Permission to fire is granted when you have a clear field to fire. We're trying to establish land line communications with 2284.

CAR: 10-4. We're directly across the street with a shotgun, clear line of fire and when we get a target we're gonna open up.

CAR: That is 10-4.

CAR: 2501 to KGA.

CAR: 830 to 2501.

CAR: 2501.

CAR: On the roof of the firehouse with 1964 unit. When the other unit opens fire we can open fire. You can send an ambulance to get that other officer out of here. This guy is gonna die.

19:31:40

CAR: 2501. 10-4 we'll have an ambulance standing by. KGA, have an ambulance 10-11 2501 at Carrollton and Baltimore Street.

CAR: 962, get someone to fire on that dude.....he is tearing up the car with this officer hiding behind it.

CAR: 901.

DIS: 901.

CAR: Advise any units if they have a clear shot, to fire at him. He's firing at the police that are pinned down.

CAR: 2501to all units. The only unit that is to fire is the sniper.....?...10-6 all units.

DIS: 2501 advise all units do not fire. Only the sniper units.

CAR: 830 to 2501.

CAR: 2501.

CAR: I have a unit up on top of the firehouse here. 1964 has got rifle slugs. How about permission to put 'em in there?

CAR: 10-4.

DIS: All right, all units, 10-6 on the fire. Do not fire until 2501 gives the word. They want to make sure they get the injured officer. They're sending in a team at this time and when they're in position they'll give you the information.

19:33:00

CAR: 2501 to KGA......2501 to 1956.

CAR: 830 to 2501.

CAR: 830.

CAR: The officer that's hit in the chest is lying beside a yellow Pinto wagon. Negative, alongside the blue and white van.

CAR: 2501 to 1956.

CAR: 1956 standing by.

CAR: What is your 10-20?

CAR: We are at the alley, 1200 block of West Lombard, waiting for instructions.

CAR: Can you see the injured officers?

CAR: 830 in reference.

CAR: 2501--go ahead.

CAR: All right now, this officer that's shot in the chest, he's in front of a green Dodge. It's the third car up from the corner on Carey Street. There's a blue and white wagon with two officers behind it. A blue and white van and there's a yellow Pinto station wagon with one officer behind it and the next car up is a green Dodge with a black vinyl top and that officer's lying alongside it. That's the one that's hit in the chest. Also they think he is dead at this time.

19:34:40

CAR: 2245 to KGA. 2245 KGA.

DIS: 2245.

CAR: If you have a unit with a shotgun...shoot that street light out, and it'd give us some darkness maybe to get that officer out from there. The street light is too light. Have 'em shoot that light out.

CAR: 1951. Negative. 10-6,....10-6---?----He's blowing that light out.

CAR: 2501. 10-4. All units disregard the last. All units disregard the last.

CAR: 830, have 'em hold their fire.

DIS: All units, 830 advises do not fire at this time.

CAR: The lights are out now, but there's a lot of people down on the corner.

CAR: Let's get the officers out, for Christ sake.

CAR: 2501 to 1956.

CAR: 1956.

CAR: Do you know where the officers are now?

CAR: 10-4.... On Carey Street up on Carey. Three cars up.

CAR: Can you see them? Can you reach them?

CAR: We cannot see them from here. We have to change our location to an alley up the street here.

CAR: 10-4. 2401 to 1956.

CAR: 1956 standing by.

CAR: If I give you cover fire, can you reach those officers?

CAR: 10-6.... I'll go around there and determine that.

CAR: 1901 to the Command Post.

CAR: 2501 standing by.

CAR: Joe, I have the gas man with me; we went across Carey Street. Can you get a couple of those guys to give me a burst of fire so we can get across?

CAR: Lieutenant, you're giving me too much radio. I can't hear anything you said.

DIS: All units 10-6. They want you to repeat slowly, please.

CAR: 2501 to 1901, give me that again.

CAR: Just a second, Joe.

CAR: Cut one of the radios off. Lieutenant and I can't hear you.

DIS: 1901, can you repeat your information to 2501?

19:37:20

CAR: 1901. I need a base of fire for a couple guys to throw a few rounds, at the front of that place so we can get across Carey Street and have a better shot to throw some gas in there.

DIS: 2501.

CAR: to any unit across the street from 1301 Carey-----{ERROR}

CAR: 1912 and 1340.

CAR: Put down some cover fire when I give you the word.

CAR: 10-4, we're ready.

CAR: 1901.

DIS: All units 10-6 till 2501 gives them word for cover fire.

CAR: 830 in reference.

DIS: All units 10-6

CAR: 10-33 in reference to the sniper.

CAR: 2501 to 1901.

DIS: All units 10-6, until 1901 and 2501 get their cover fire.

CAR: 2501 to 1901. I will give the word for cover fire. When you hear the fire proceed.

CAR: 10-4 ready.

CAR: 2501 to 1912. 1914 throw in fire in that location.

CAR: Right now?

19:38:20

CAR: 10-4 NOW.

CAR: 2501 to 1901.....2501 to 1901....2501 to 1901.....2501 to 1956.

CAR: 1956.

CAR: 1956, what's your location now; can you get down to the officer?

CAR: 2501 to all units on the scene, 10-22 any further firing, 10-22 any further firing.

19:39:10

CAR: 1901 to Command Post.

CAR: Command Post.

CAR: Can you give us the location where those Western officers said they had a good shot at the front of it?

CAR: Talk slower, Lieutenant; I can't understand you.

DIS: 10-6 a minute. 1901, is that in reference to 1304 or six West Lombard?

CAR: 10-4.

DIS: I believe that was 747 unit. He said they have an officer in the back that will show 'em where to go.

CAR: They got all the wounded officers.

CAR: 1956 to 2501.

CAR: 2501.

CAR: Be advised, Sir, I'm with one of the injured officers now; there's another one we have to get to, it's about one car further south than I am.

CAR: 10-4, advise me when you can evacuate those officers and I'll throw in cover fire for you; can you do that?

CAR: 10-4. We can get one out right away. If you throw fire as soon as I get another officer to help me drag him out.

CAR: 2501...you can get the officer out, if you have cover fire?

CAR: 10-4.

CAR: 10-4, advise me when.

CAR: 2501 to 1912.

CAR: 1912.

CAR: 10-6 there, when I give you the word, throw in more cover fire. Do you need ammunition?

CAR: 10-4, Sir.

CAR: Is that officer right in front of the house across from that car? I'm close.

CAR: 2187, 2187; be advised I'm directly across the street right above the guy too, right across Lombard Street.

CAR: Is he behind that blue car?

CAR: He's behind the blue car across the street.

CAR: 2187....I'm above him on top of the house.

19:41:10

CAR: 830 to 2501, they got a couple of the officers out.

19:41:30

CAR: 836 in reference.

CAR: 2501. Go ahead.

CAR: All right, we got 'em in a green, a green van. And the rest of 'em are still over here.

CAR: 2501, you're gonna have to slow down and talk so that I can understand you.

CAR: 1956 to 2501. We have one officer out, still one down.

CAR: 2501, 10-4. Can you get the officer out with cover fire?

CAR: 10-4, if you got plenty of it.....10-6 a minute, we'll give you the word when we're ready.

CAR: 830 to 2501.

CAR: 2501.

CAR: 830; I have three Tactical officers up here on top the firehouse. Now let us know when you want cover fire, and I have a clear view of the other injured officer down there.

CAR: 10-4-----?--- I'm sending ammunition down to 1306.

CAR: 1107.

DIS: 1107.

CAR: 1107 to Homicide Unit. I got the man shot in the chest. I'm gonna need an ambo to take him to the hospital. We are now clear at Pratt and Carey. Now clear at Pratt and Carey.

19:42:30

DIS: 1107 has the officer clear with the shot in the chest. You're taking him away now?

CAR: ---?---, the officer's clear.

CAR: Get to Hollins and Stockton. Send him to Hollins and Stockton.

CAR: 746......(several cars talking, unable to understand anything)....An officer hit down at Stockton Street. Stockton and Lombard,

DIS: Stockton and Lombard; you have another injured officer?

19:43:00

CAR: Stockton off of Hollins, have 'em come to Hollins Street. I'll get---?---?----

DIS: All units 10-6, we have the information, Stockton and Lombard, we have another injured officer.

CAR: 795 in reference, have that ambo come to Stockton and Hollins. I'll direct him in, just get him up here.

DIS: Be advised the man now using the radio; we cannot understand you. Your gonna have to speak slower.

19:43:30

CAR: Ok....Direct that ambo to Hollins and Stockton. I'll direct him in, Hollins and Stockton.

DIS: Ok, we realize the situation at Hollins and Stockton for the ambulance for the injured officer.

(Several cars talking)

CAR: 2501 to all units, 10-6....... 2501 to the officer at Stockton and Lombard......2501 to any officer at Stockton and Lombard.

DIS: The officer on the scene is that Hollins and Stockton you want?

CAR: 10-4..... Hollins and Stockton Street, this man is hurt bad.

DIS: KGA to 2501, All units 10-6,....All units 10-6. ...2501 only.

CAR: 2501 to the unit at Stockton and Lombard Can that abbo get in there without going under fire?

CAR: We got him now, we got him now.

DIS: KGA to all units,...10-6....All units,...10-6, Stay off the radio.....2501 ONLY.

CAR: 2501.

DIS: We have a subject on the phone, states he is the suspect, his name is John Williams, he says stop firing, he wants to surrender. He's at 1303 West Lombard, His name is John Williams.

CAR: 2501 to KGA......Advise that suspect to come out of the house with his hands up in the air, absolutely no weapons in his hands. Advise any units on the scene to 10-22 any firing. Let that suspect come out of the house.

19:45:20

DIS: All units.......All units hold your fire. ...All units hold your fire.

CAR: (unknown): Shoot him.

CAR: (unknown): Waste him.

CAR: 2187 in reference to that, please.

DIS: 2187.

CAR: 10-4, I have information from a citizen, this man's name was Jimmy Burrough..... This is at 1306. All units use Caution.

SIMULCAST

19:45:40

CAR: 2501 to all units; stand by until we get in position.

DIS: KGA to all units; be advised, this subject is supposed to be a John Williams, he's at 1303 West Lombard. He states that he's now in the basement, he wants to surrender; 2501 advises all officers hold your fire.

CAR: 2501 to KGA.

DIS: 2501 Only.

CAR: You still have land line with that man?

CAR: 1901 to Command Post.

CAR: Command Post 2501 standing by.

Car: We're in a position to throw some gas in there, Joe.

If you can, give us a base of fire to give us some cover for the man to get over the edge of this roof.

CAR: 10-4....10-6 ....just one minute, Lieutenant....10-6....2501 to KGA.

CAR: Unit 9, will you tell 'em to keep the line clear.

DIS: We have an officer on the telephone that states this is the suspect and he's gonna advise him to come out of the building with with his hands raised, nothing in his hands.

CAR: 2501.....10-4, advise him to lay down on the street when he comes out of that building.......to lay down on the ground.

CAR: Cover the rear door, Joe.

19:47:00

CAR: 2501 to KGA......Have him come out of the building.

DIS: 10-4

CAR: All units...10-6 on any fire...All units

CAR: 748

DIS: 748.

CAR: Have CP 11 come down Stockton Street to Lombard. The Command Post wants him down here.

CAR: 1951 to 2501... Be advised the man's out of the house, two officers have him in custody, have all other men stay away from the house.

19:47:30

CAR: 2501 to all

SIMULCAST

DIS: Attention from the officer, there's two officers have the suspect in custody

Two officers have the suspect in custody, all officers are to stay away from the scene. All weapons are supposed to have been left on the third floor of 1303 west Lombard.

19:47:50

END

Officer Robert Brown, Western District, was off duty and sitting on his porch when the shots rang out that night. He responded to the sounds of the shots being fired to assist with the incident. The suspect Johnnie Earl Williams was taken into custody, and Motor Officer Pete Richter lead the way to the paddy wagon for transport to the Homicide Unit.

LOMBARD CAREY4a

POLICE DEPARTMENT

BALTIMORE, MARYLAND
Communications Division

Transcript

450 Mhz

Western District Dispatcher
16 April 1976
Time: 18:59:40

DISP: {SIMULCAST by City-Wide}

CAR: ----?---- 10-23

CAR: 793.

DIS: 793.

19:00:10

CAR: We're responding to that 13 on Carey Street.

CAR: 714 get some shotgun units down here.

DIS: Any units responding stay off Carey Street.

{SIMULCAST, same, City-Wide}

19:00:40

CAR: 713

DIS: 713. Units on the scene, it's supposed to be on the southwest corner, the second house.

(SIMULCAST, SAME)

19:01:20

CAR: 746-- I'm going on City-Wide for Carey Street

CAR: 710.

DIS: 710.

CAR: Advise the units on City-Wide and direct traffic going eastbound on Baltimore. Also have one at Carrollton, direct westbound traffic. We also need another one at Carey and Fayette diverting southbound till this thing's clear. 10-4?

DIS: I don't have anything to send there now, they're down there on Carey.

CAR: 772. I'll take Calhoun and Baltimore.

19:03:20

( SIMULCAST, City-Wide, ....of Unit 9)

19:03:40

CAR: 713 with a 10-33.

DIS: Go ahead.

CAR: 713 with an officer shot; an officer has been shot at the unit block of Carey Street.

DIS: That's in front of the engine house on Carey Street?

CAR: The officer's shot bad.

DIS: Ok, an ambulance will be notified. All Units 10-6 until we get Carey Street cleared up. All Units 10-6

19: 04:10

CAR: ---?--- in reference.

DIS: Go ahead.

CAR: ---?--- the subject is supposed to be in an alley close to the firehouse.

DIS: Give that information to City-Wide, for a City-Wide broadcast, also.

CAR: 710, see if you can ascertain who it is.

DIS: We don't mention any name on the air.

CAR: 762's on the scene.

DIS: 10-9.

CAR: 762's on the scene.

DIS: Any unit on the scene at the firehouse on Carey Street.

CAR: ---?---

DIS: Let me have the ranking officer on this channel.

19:05:30

CAR: 703.

DIS: 703

CAR: I'm the ranking officer Sir, do you have any ambo on the way?

DIS: That's correct, an ambo's on the way. If you have any information in reference to the subject's.......?

DIS: (SIMULCAST "heavily armed" info)

19:05:50

DIS: 703

CAR: 703.

CAR: 713.

DIS: 713

CAR: I'd like permission to throw a large amount of fire to evacuate this wounded officer.

DIS: 713 car.

CAR: 713.

DIS: Have you got the officer out of the area?

CAR: We're pinned down; anybody can get a clear shot at the building, start taking it, so we can move that officer.

19:07:00

CAR: 713.

DIS: 713.

CAR: We're pinned down in front of....

CAR: 711.

DIS: 711.

CAR: Advise I'm pinned down in front of the fire station. I've got an officer here, he's been hit in the upper part of his chest. He's bleeding very badly. We can't get anybody in or out right now.

DIS: 711.....711 car.

CAR: 711.

DIS: Are you able to get to the officer?

CAR: 10-4.

DIS: Do you have the officer?

CAR: I'm holding his arm.

DIS: 10-9 the message.

CAR: He's holding his own, now.

CAR: 710.

DIS: 710.

CAR: Ascertain from 11 if he's got that officer.

DIS: 711 car.

CAR: 10-4, keep everybody out of the unit block of Carey.

DIS: Ok, all units.

(SIMULCAST to 10-26 City-Wide)